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Summary
Fiscal Policies, Inflation and Capital Formation
Martin Feldstein
This paper studies the long-run impact of fiscal policies on inflation
and capital formation. The analysis uses an expanded monetary growth model
in which the government finances its deficit by issueing both money and
interest-bearing debt.
One major focus of the paper is the effect of a permanent increase in
the government's rea~ defic~t in a fully employed economy. The analysis
shows that a greater deficit must increase inflation, reduce capital forma-
tion, or both. With U.S. tax rules and the prevailing monetary and debt-
management policies, a greater deficit is likely to cause both more inflation
and lower capital intensity.
The second purpose of the paper is to analyze the effect of an exogenous
increase in the saving rate and the possibility of "excessive saving" that
arises when the yield on capital becomes so low that individuals prefer to
hold government bonds rather than the more risky claims to real capital.
Under some such conditions, an increase in saving could cause unemployment.
The analysis shows that this problem can be avoided however by reducing the
tax on capital income (or, in some cases, by an increased deficit that
absorbs some but not all of the higher savings rate). In short, by using
fiscal incentives as well as monetary accomodation, an increased saving rate
can be converted to greater capital intensity.
Martin Feldstein
N. B. E. R.
1050 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Martin Feldstein*
The unprecedently large government deficits in recent years have stimu-
lated speculation about the adverse effects of such deficits on inflation and
on private capital formation. While it is clear that deficits may have no
adverse effect in an economy with sufficient unemployed resources, the effects
of a deficit when there is full employment are less clear. Is a persistent
increase in the government deficit necessarily inflationary? Does it neces-
sarily reduce private capital formation? Is it possible to avoid both adverse
effects? A primary purpose of this paper is to answer these questions in the
context of a fully employed and growing economy.
A closely related issue is the relation between private saving and capital
formation when money and other government liabilities are alternatives to real
capital in individual portfolios. Keynes (193~, Harrod (1948) and Tobin
(1965) have all emphasized the possibility of excess saving when individuals
will not hold capital unless its yield exceeds some minimum required return.
When the return on capital is too low, an increase in saving only reduces
aggregate demand. If prices are flexible downward, this causes deflation until
the increased value of real balances causes a sufficient reduction in saving;
if prices cannot fall, the excess saving results in unemployment.
*President, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Professor of Econo-
mics, Harvard University. This paper is part of the NBER Program of Research
on Capital Formation. I am grateful for financial support from the National
Science Foundation and the NBER. The paper presents the view of the author
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Three ways of averting such "excess saving" have been emphasized in both
theory and practice. The thrust of the Keynesian prescription was to increase
the government deficit to provide demand for the resources that would not
otherwise be used for either consumption or investment. In this way, aggregate
demand would be maintained by substituting public consumption for private
consumption. A second alternative prescription was to reduce the private
saving rate. Early Keynesians like Seymour Harris (194~ saw the new social
security program as an effective way to reduce aggregate saving. The third
type of policy, developed by James Tobin, relies on increasing the rate of
inflation and making money less attractive relative to real capital. In
Tobin's analysis, the resulting increase in capital intensity offsets the
higher saving rate and therefore maintains aggregate demand.
The current paper will examine ways of increasing capital intensity in
this context without raising the rate of inflation. The analysis will also
show why, contrary to Tobin's conclusion, a higher rate of inflation may not
succeed in increasing investors' willingness to hold real capital.
An important feature of the analysis in this paper is a monetary growth
model that distinguishes between money and interest-bearing government bonds.
With this distinction, we can compare government deficits financed by borrowing
with deficits financed by creating money. It is .possible also to examine the
effect of changes in the interest rate on government debt while maintaining
the fact that money is not interest bearing. The two types of government
liabilities also permit analyzing the distinction between the traditional
liquidity preference and a demand for government bonds that we shall call
safety preference. In practice, this safety preference may be much more
important than the traditional liquidity preference.- 3 -
The first section of the paper develops the three-asset monetary growth
model that will be used in the remaining analysis. Section two then considers
the effects of changes in the government deficit. The effects of increased
saving on aggregate demand and capital intensity are developed in section
three. There is a brief concluding section.- 4 -
1. A Three Asset Model of Monetary Growth
The model developed here differs from the traditional monetary growth
(e.g., Tobin, 1965, and Levhani and Patinkin 1968) in two important ways.
First, instead of the usual assumption that all taxes are lump sum levies,
the current analysis recognizes taxes on capital income that lower the net
1 rate of return. Second, the government deficit is financed not only be
increasing the money supply but also by issueing interest bearing government
2 debt. Throughout the analysis we maintain the simplifying assumption that
the savings rate out of real disposable income is fixed; the tax on capital
income affects the allocation of saving but not the saving rate itself.
Because the analysis in the sections that follow will focus on comparative
steady-state dynamics, only these steady state properties will be discussed
3 here.
The economy is characterized by an exogenously growing population
(1.1) N = N e
nt
0'
The labor force is a constant fraction of the population and technical progress
is subsumed into population growth. Production can be described by an aggre-
gate production function with constant returns to scale. The relation between
per capitaoutput (y) and the per capitacapital stock (k) is
lFeldstein (1975) and Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1978) show the
importance of recognizing capital income taxes in analyzing the effects of
inflation in a monetary growth model. Corporate and personal taxes were
distinguished there but will not be in the current paper.
2Green and Sheshinski (1977) examine an economy with both bonds and money
but assume that such bonds are perfect substitutes for private capital in
investors' portfolios. Their analysis generally focuses on quite different
issues.
3Section 3 will however consider the possibility of disequilibrium beha-
vior associated with excess saving.(1.2) y = f(k)
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with f'>O and f"<O. For simplicity, output is measured net of depreciation
and depreciation is not explicitly included in the analysis.
1.1 The Government Budget Constraint
Government spending (G), which includes payment of interest on the govern-
ment debt, must be financed by either tax receipts, money creation, or
borrowing. Total real tax receipts (T) are the sum of a lump sum tax (To) and
the revenue that results from taxing the income from real capital at rate T.
The money created by the government (M) is the only money in the economy and
does not bear interest. The time rate of change of the stock of nominal money
is DM; the real value of the extra money created in this way is DM/p. Govern-
ment bonds bear interest at rate i; the nominal market value of these bonds
is B and the real value of new borrowing is DB/p.l
The government's budget constraint may be written
(1. 3) G
Alternatively, it will be convenient to denote the real government deficit by
b. and write
(1. 4)
In steady state, the ratio of real money per unit of real capital (M/pK)
1These bonds may be thought of as treasury bills although their maturity
is irrelevant for steady state analysis as long as that maturity is finite.
We ignore changes in the market value that would temporarily result from
changes in the interest rate if the maturity were not very short.- 6 -
must remain constant. This implies that the rate of growth ofM is equal to
1 the rate of growth of pK, or with Dp/p=n,
(1. 5)
Similarly, the steady state rate of growth of nominal government bonds equals
the inflation rate plus the real growth rate of the economy:
(1.6) DB
B=n+n.
Substituting these expressions into 1.4 and dividing by the population
gives the steady state per capita deficit:
(1. 7) ~ = (n+n) :N + (n+n) p~
With lower case letters representing real per capita values, 1.7 can be
rewritten
(1. 8) o = (n+n) (m+b)
the real per capita deficit equals the product of the economy's nominal growth
rate and the real per capita government liabilities.
1.2 Portfolio Behavior
The real value of household assets is the sum of the real values of
2 government liabilities and the capital stock:
lThis uses the fact that in steady state k=K/N is constant, implying
DK/K=n.
2The private bonds and equities that represent the ownership claims to
the capital stock are not explicitly recognized. The tax rate T can be
regarded as the effective tax rate corresponding to the steady state mix of
debt and equity finance. See Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1978b).(1.9) a = b + m + k
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We shall simplify the description of the households' portfolio behavior by
assuming that the equilibrium ratio of real bonds to capital depends on the
difference between the net real yield on capital (r) and the real yield on
1 government bonds (i-n):
(1.10)
b k = 8 [r+n-i] ,8'<0
Because the depreciation method used in the United States and in most other
countries is based on the origin~l costs of plant and equipment, the tax
2
liability per unit of capital increases with the rate of inflation. We spall
therefore write the net rate of return as
(1.11) r = f' - T (f' + An)
where the parameter A indicates the extent to which a higher inflation rate
increases the tax liability. Substituting into 1.10 yields the equilibrium
bond portfolio condition:
(1.12)
b k = 8 ~l-T)f' + (l-TA)n - q , 8'<0
With safe short-term interest bearing government debt available, indivi-
duals should hold money only for transaction purposes. As Baumol (1952) and
others have shown, this demand for money varies positively with the level of
1 .
Recall that we are ignoring the personal tax on investment income; alter-
natively ~ may be assumed to include both the personal and corporate taxes while
i is net of personal tax.
2See Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1978), especially the appendix by
Alan Auerbach, and Feldstein and Summers (1977).- 8 -





An important feature of an economy with money or other government liabil-
ities is the possibility that individuals will be unwilling to hold capital
unless its yield is above some minimum level. In the traditional two-asset
Keynesian model, this is represented as a liquidity trap, i.e., as an infinitely
elastic demand for money at some low rate of interest. A more realistic
description is possible with the current three-asset model. When the real net
yield on capital becomes very low relative to the real yield on government
bonds, investors will want to hold government bonds instead of capital; in
the notation of equation 1.12, the absolute value of S' becomes infinite when
2 the real differentialbecomes very small. The reason that investors prefer
government bonds in this situation is that the pretax profitability of private
capital is uncertain. The bond demand behavior will therefore be referred to
as a "safety preference" relation to distinguish it from the liquidity prefer-
ence relation that governs the demand for money.3
lThis simplifies by assuming that individuals regard the interest bearing
government debt rather than real capital as an alternative to transaction
balances. Transaction balances are also assumed to depend on income rather
than wealth when in reality both are important.
2This unwillingness to own real capital may also increase the demand for
money but that effect is likely to be small relative to the increased demand
for bonds.
3The private securities are generally as marketable as government bonds
and, to the extent that they have the same maturity structure, their price will
be as sensitive to interest rate fluctuations. Their liquidity is therefore
similar even though the safety and predictability of the yields differ substan-
tially.- 9 -
1.3 The Supply and Demand for Savings
The supply of savings (S) is proportional to the households' real dispos-
able income (H):
(1.14) S = a-H
The saving propensity will be assumed to be constant. Disposable income is
equal to national income (Y) minus both the government's tax receipts (T) and
the fall in the real value of the population's money and government bonds
1 (TIM/p and TIB/p).
SaYing is therefore
(1.15) S = a(Y _ T _ TIM _ TIB)
P p
or, using equation 1.3,
(1.16) S = a (Y _ G + DM + DB _ TIM _ TIB).
P p p P
Since DM/p - TIM/p = nM/p (with a similar equivalence for bonds),
(1.17) S nM nB a (Y - G + - +-).
p p
In steady state, government spending must bear a stable relation to
national income. The analysis that follows assumes that a fraction y of
national income is devoted to government spending inclusive of interest on the
government debt. This implies that any increase in interest on the government
debt causes a corresponding reduction in other government spending.
lThis assumes that households as a whole regard government bonds as net
worth, implicitly ignoring the corresponding tax liabilities that they and
future generations must bear in order to pay the interest and principal on
these bopds.- 10 -
All saving must be absorbed in either real capital accumulation or addi-
tional real money and bonds:
(1.18) S = DK + D(M/p) + D(B/p)
The constant ratio of capital to labor in steady state growth implies DK=nK.
Similarly, the constancy of m=M/pN and b=B/pN implies that D(M/p)=nM/p and
D(B/p)=nB/p. Thus
(1.19)
Combining equations 1.17 and 1.19, writing yY for G, and dividing by N
yields the per capita growth equilibrium condition:
(1.20) a [y(l-y) + nm + nbl = nk + nrn + nb- 11 -
2. Deficits, Inflation and Capital Intensity
The model developed in section 1 can now be used to analyze how changes
in the government deficit affect the rate of inflation and the capital inten-
sity of the economy. Can the government increase the real steady-state
deficit in this fully employed economy without causing either inflation,
reduced capital intensity, or both? What policies can be pursued to mitigate
the adverse effects of the deficit? What happens when the policy options of
the government are restricted?
To answer these questions, it is useful to collect the four equations
that describe the steady state behavior of the economy:
(2.1) 8 = (1T+n) (m+b)
(2.2) m L(i) . f(k)
(2.3) b = S [(l-T)f' (k) + (l-TA)1T - i] • k
(2.4) (J [(l-y)f(k) + nm + nb] n[k+m+b]
Where f(k) has been substituted for y in 2.2 and 2.4. The policy instruments
controlled by the government are the size of the deficit (8) , the share of
government spending in national income (y), the interest rate on government
1 (i) and the tax (T and A). bonds rates on capital income For given values
of these policy instruments and the exogenous growth rate (n), the four equa-
tions determine the values of k, n, m and b.
It is clear from these four equations that the government can increase
its deficit without inducing any changes in inflation or capital intensity if
lRecall that this would not in general equal the rate of return on
private capital.- 12 -
it can vary all of the other policy instruments (y, i, T and A). In practice,
however, the government does not alter the share of government spending in
national income (y) in order to neutralize the effect of a deficit. l It is
tempting to conclude that, even if y is held constant, the government can
still increase the deficit without changing TI or k because it still has three
unconstrained instruments. It is easily shown, however, that this is not true;
an increased deficit must then be accompanied by a change in either inflation,
capital intensity, or both. To see this note that (with y constant) equation
2.4 implies that if dk=O it is also true that d(m+b)=O. Equation 2.1 shows
that d(m+b)=O and dTI=O together imply do=O. The deficit must be unchanged if
both inflation and capital intensity are unchanged.
The government can however affect the combination of changes in inflation
and capital intensity that occurs by its debt management policy and its tax
policy. Because changes in tax policy (in T and A) are not a typical govern-
ment response, most of this section will assume that T and A as well as yare
unchanged. Our analysis focuses on debt management policy, i.e., on the way
that the government adjusts the relative supply of money and bonds or, equiva-
lently, the rate of interest on government debt.
2.1 A Deficit Causing Both Increased Inflation and Reduced Capital Intensity
With the type of debt policy currently pursued in the United States, an
increase in the steady state deficit is likely to cause both a higher rate of
inflation and a reduced capital intensity of production. More specifically,
most empirical research indicates that the government issues a mix of money and
lThis would in particular require reducing the sh~re of government
spending in national income. To see this, note that equation 2.1 implies
do = (TI+n) d (m+b) if dTI=O. Equation 2.4 implies -kcrfdy = (l-TI) n d (m+b)
since dk=O. Combining these two shows dyjdo<O.- 13 ...
debt in such a way that th~ real interest rate on government debt remains
1 approximately unchanged. The effect of an increased deficit can therefore
be analyzed by totally differentiating equations 2.1 through 2.4 subject to
the condition di=dn.
The key to the adverse effect of inflation on capital intensity is seen
in the total differential of 2.3 subject to di=dn:
(2.5) db = (S+kS'(l-T)f")dk - kS'TAdn
The partial effect of an increase in inflation is to increase the demand for
bonds rather than capital because the real yield on bonds is maintained while
the real yield on capital falls by TAdn. If this positive effect of inflation
on the demand for bonds is large enough to outweigh the negative effect of
inflation on the demand from money that is implied by equation 2.2 with di=dn:
(2.6) dm = Lf'dk + fL'dn
the effect of an increased deficit can be shown unambiguously to reduce k. To
see this, note first that 2.4 implies
(2.7) d(m+b) -----:-(-::-l-_y'-')...;::f_'_-n;;:.;. dk
(l-o)n
Adding 2.5 and 2.6 and then using 2.7 to eliminate d(m+b) yields:
(2.8) (l-y)f'-n dk'"' (Lf'+S+kS'(l-T)f")dk + (fL'-kS'TA)dn
(l-O')n
Similarly, differentiating equation 2.1 and using 2.7 yields
lEvidence that the nominal interest rate rises by approximately the rate
of inflation was presented by Irving Fisher (954) and has been verified by
Yohe and KarI).ovsky (1969), Feldstein and Eckstein (1970), Feldstein and Summers
(1977), and others. The assumption in Tobin (1965) that di=O is clearly incon-
sistent with experience when i is interpreted as the yield on government debt
rather than the yield on money.(2.9)
- 14 -
= a (l-y)f'-n dk + (m+k)dn
(l-a)n
Using 2.8 to eliminate dn from 2.9 yields:
(2.10) dkI do di=d'lT
= (l-a) n (fL'-k6'TA)
(n+n) (a(l-y)f'-n) (fL'-k6'TA) +
(m+b)(tr(l-y)f'-n-n(l-a)(Lf'+S+kB' (1-'£)fll) )
With the increased demand for bonds induced by higher inflation greater than
the reduced demand for money, fL'-k6'TA > 0 and the numerator is positive.
Since stability required a(l-y)f'-n < 0, the denominator is negative. Under
these quite plausible conditions, a higher deficit reduces capital formation.
Since 2.8 implies that dk and dn are of opposite signs, the higher deficit also
increases inflation.
2.2 A Deficit without Inflation
The bleak outcome of increased inflation and reduced capital intensity is
not a necessary implication of a greater deficit. By totally differentiating
equation 2.1 through 2.4 with the constraint that dn=O, it is possible to find






do = (n+n) d(m+b)
d(m+b) = (fL'-kS')di + (Lf'+S+ks'(l-T)f")dk
(a(l-y)f'-n)dk = (l-a)nd(m+b)
The separate behavior of m and b is irrelevant for determining the change in i
that is required to keep the inflatiqn rate unchanged. Equation 2.13 can be- 15 -
substituted into 2.12 to eliminate dk and 2.11 can then be used to eliminate




= cr(l-y)f'-n-(Lf'+8+k8' (l-,)f") (l-cr)n
(Tf+n) (cr(1-y)f'-n)(fL'-k8')
The numerator is unambiguously negative since (1) cr(l-y)f'-n<O for stability
and (2) f'>O, 13'<0 and f"<O make -(Lf'+I3+kl3'(l-,)f")(l-cr)n<O.
The first term of the denominator is positive while, as already noted, the
second term is negative. The final term in the denominator is the difference
between the effect on the demand for money of an increase in the interest rate
on government debt and its effect on the demand for the bonds themselves.
Since a higher value of i can be expected to increase the demand for bonds by
more than it reduces the demand for money, this term will be taken to be
positive. The denominator as a whole is therefore negative. Thus, di/do>O.
In short, the interest rate must increase when the deficit increases if
the inflation rate is to remain constant. It is easy to understand why this
interest rate increase is necessary. Equation 2.11 indicates that a stable
inflation rate requires that m+b must increase with the deficit. This is so
because a higher value of m+b permits the larger annual increase in the money
supply and/or government borrowing that must accompany an increased deficit to
be absorbed without a higher proportional rate of growth of either money or
bonds. To state this same point in a slightly different way, the faster
growth of government liabilities can be absorbed without increasing the propor-
tiona1 growth rate of either money or bonds if the level of money and bonds
that is demanded (i.e., the denominators of the proportional growth rates) is
increased. The higher interest rate makes this possible by increasing the
demand for bonds by more than it decreases the demand for money.- 16 -
Note that in practice the required change would come about by financing
the increased deficit with a higher ratio of bonds to money than had prevailed
in the initial equilibrium. Achieving this reduction in liquidity would
require paying a higher rate of interest on those bonds.
It is clear that this policy of a higher interest rate and an increased
supply of real government debt must reduce the capital intensity of production.






The cost of avoiding the higher inflation rate that would otherwise accompany
an increased deficit is a lower level of capital intensity and a smaller real
income.
2.3 A Deficit without Reduced Capital Intensity
The crowding out of real capital accumulation by the government deficit
can be avoided by allowing inflation to ~ccur. It is worth examining how
much inflation and what change in the interest rate are needed to keep capital
intensity unchanged.
Differentiating 2.4 with dk=O shows immediately that m+b must also remain
unchanged. Equation 2.1 then implies that do = (m+b)d~, i.e., that an increase
in the deficit must increase inflation. With d(m+b)=O, equations 2.2 and 2.3
together imply
(2.16) o (fL'-kS')di + (l-LA)kS'd~




= (m+b) (fL'-k8' )
As explained above, the denominator is positive in the likely case that a rise
in the interest rate increases the demand for bonds by more than it decreases
the demand for money. The value of A would be zero if the tax law did not
cause inflation to reduce the real net return on capital. In that case, the
numerator is positive and di/do>O. More generally, even when historic cost
depreciation rules do raise the effective tax rate on real profits (A>O), the
numerator wili still be positive as long as inflation raises the nominal after
1 tax return on capital.
The mechanism by which a higher interest rate permits a constant value of
k is clear from the derivation. A constant value of k implies a constant value
of m+b and therefore an increased value of TI. With a constant value of k, a
higher rate of inflation would actually decrease b (and therefore m+b) unless
i is raised to prevent this.
Comparing equation 2.17 and 2.14 shows that the increase in i that keeps






= 0(l-x)f'-n-(Lf'+8+k8' (l-T)f") (l-T)n(m+b)-
(m+n) (fL'-k8') (TI+n) (o(l-y)f'-n)
(TI +n) (0(I-X)f'-ry(1-TA)k8'
> o
The reason for this is clear. Holding k and therefore m+b constant implies
dTI>O. Making dTI=O requires an increase in m+b and therefore a higher rate of
interest.
lThe nominal after tax return on capital is (l-T)f'+(l-TA)TI.- 18 -
2.4 A Deficit Financed by Interest-bearing Debt
A particularly interesting debt policy requires that any increase in the
deficit be financed only by additional borrowing. The real growth of the
money supply remains constant. This section looks briefly at the effect of
such a policy. This specification of debt policy implies that the real rate
of new money creation remains unchanged: DM/pN is constant. Since DM/pN=
m(DM/M)=m(n+n») this debt policy implies m(~+n)=c, a constant. The implication
of this for capital intensity and inflation depends on the interest elasticity
of the demand for money. On the simplifying assumption that the money demand
is completely inelastic (L'=O) it is easily shown that the.deficit unambigu-




do = (~+n)db + bdn
(2.20) dm -m -- dn
~+n
Combining m=Lf and m(~+n)=c yields
(2.21) (~+n)f'dk -fd~
Thus inflation and capital intensity move in opposite directions. The growth
equilibrium condition of equation 2.4 implies
(2.22) o(l-y)f'-n dk = db + dm
(l-o)n
Using 2.20 and 2.21 to eliminate dm yields




Equation 2.19 can thus be rewritten using 2.21 and 2.23 as
(2.24) do = (7f+n) { (1-1)£'-n _ mf' _ bf'_l. dk
(l-o)n f f~
This shows that dk/do<O and 2.21 then implies that d7f/do>O. Thus even with a
debt policy that keeps the growth of real money balances unchanged, the deficit
increases inflation and reduces capital intensity.- 20 -
3. Fiscal Incentives, Saving and Aggregate Demand
The three-asset growth model can be used to analyze the effects of an
1 exogenous increase in the saving rate. The most important issue to be exam-
ined is the possibility of excess saving. Under quite reasonable conditions,
an increase in the saving rate will be absorbed into higher capital intensity
without any problem for aggregate demand if there is accomodating monetary
policy. The possibility of excess saving arises when investors are unwilling
to hold real capital in their portfolio at a lower rate of return; we shall
refer to this as a "safety trap" by analogy to the traditional Keynesian
liquidity trap. The problem is exacerbated if the yield on government bonds'
also cannot be lowered, i.e., if the economy is also in a liquidity trap.
The problem of excess saving can manifest itself in two ways. Under some
conditions, the extra saving could be absorbed in additional capital if the
steady state rate of inflation is reduced. If there is no inflation in the
initial equilibrium, the increased saving rate would involve a continuous
price deflation. While there may be no theoretical problem with this, as a
practical matter the downward rigidity of money wages could prevent this from
occurring. The additional saving would not be absorbed but would result in
unemployment. The problem is even worse when the "safety trap" am '~iquidity
trap' conditions both prevail. Under these conditions, the extra savings
cannot be absorbed in increased capital even if the inflation rate could be
permanently reduced.
The problem of excess saving arises only if the government restricts its
accomodating action to monetary policy. This section shows how tax incentives,
I .
Such an increase in the saving rate (0) may reflect a change in taste
or a change in institutions such as social security that are not explicitly
included in the model.- 21 -
or under some conditions an increased deficit, can be used to assure that an
increase in the saving rate results in a greater rate of capital formation.
3.1 Increased Saving with Accomodating Monetary Policy ,
Before studying the problem of excess saving, it is useful to examine
the nature of the well-behaved equilibrium in which additional saving can be
absorbed with the help of only accomodating monetary policy. We impose the
requirement that the real deficit (0), the share of the government in national
income (y), and the tax rates on capital income (T and A) remain constant.
The rate of inflation will also be required to remain unchanged, thus
precluding the problem of unattainable pure deflation.
The key change from the analysis of section 2 is that the differential
of the growth equilibrium condition (equation 2.4) now involves a change in
the saving rate:
(3.1) [(l-y)f+n(m+b)]da + [a(l-y)f'-n]dk - (l-a)nd(m+b) = 0
with a constant deficit (do=O) and constant inflation rate (d~=O), the govern-
ment budget constraint
(3.2) do (~+n)d(m+b) + (m+b)d~
implies d(m+b)=O. Together with 3.1 this shows inunediately that the higher






The required change in the interest rate can then be derived from the money
demand relation (equation 2.2) and the bond demand relation (equation 2.3).- 22 -
Together these imply:
(3.4) d(m+b) = [Lf'+B+kB' (l-T)f"ldk + (fL'-kB' )di + kB' (l-TA)d7T
With d(m+b)=d7T=O,
(3.5) di Lf'+B+kB'(l-T)f"
dk = - fL'-kB'
If the effect of a change in the interest rate on the demand for bonds
exceeds its effect on the demand for money, the denominator is positive and
(dijdk)<O. To achieve this reduction in the equilibrium interest rate on
g~nment debt, the money supply must be increased relative to real income
and the supply of bonds must be reduced relative to the capital stock. The
precise changes are indicated by equations 2.2 and 2.3 and satisfy d(m+b)=O.
In short, if investors are willing to accept a lower return on capital
accompanied by a less than equal reduction in the yield on government debt,
an increase in the saving rate can raise capital intensity without any change
in inflation or other government policies. l
3.2 Safety Preference and Excess Saving
The basic insight of the Keynesian analysis is that, in a monetary
economy, additional saving will not automatically be invested. When the
yield on real capital becomes too low, individuals will prefer to hold govern-
ment bonds rather than to assume the greater risk associated with the owner-
ship of real capital. More precisely, the demand for government bonds becomes
infinitely elastic at some low differential between the yield on real capital
lIf the interest rate on government debt cannot be reduced, an increase
in the rate of inflation could achieve the same thing (as long as l~T~>O). This
is essentially Tobin's (1965) solution since he assumes di=O. The imp~ication
of section 3.1 and the remainder of section 3 is that Tobin's inflationary
policy is unnecessary.- 23 -
«l-T)f'+(l-TA)~) and the yield on government bonds (i). In the notation of
the bond demand equation,
{3.6)
B'=_oo at some low value of (l-T)f'+(l-TA)~-i. We can refer to this situation
as being in a "safety trap".
When the economy has reached this condition, a further fall in
(l-T)f'+(l-TA)~-iis not possible. This additional constraint on the adjust-
ment of the economy can be the source of an excess saving problem. When
certain further conditions e~ist, the increase in capital intensity could
only occur if the rate of inflation could be reduced. If the initial equili-
brium had no inflation (or a very low rate), the required reduction in infla-
tion might not be achievable and the extra saving would result in an
unemployment disequilibrium.l
To see the conditions under which this problem would arise, note that
the safety trap condition implies
{3.n (l-T}f"dk + (I-TA)d~ - di = 0
This in turn implies that db=Bdk and therefore that
(3.8) d(m+b) fL'di + (Lf'+B)dk
With no change in the government deficit, the government budget constraint
entails:
IThe dynamics of such an employment disequilibrium will not be considered.
The relative strength of the Pigou effect and Wicksell effect would influence
the ultimate path. For the current purpose, it is sufficient that price
deflation and unemployment would be required for at least some period of time.(3.9)
- 24 -
(n+n)d(m+b) + (m+b)dn = o.
Using this equation to eliminate d(m+b) from 3.8 and using 3.7 to rewrite di
in terms of dn and dk yields
(3.10) dn fL' (l-t)f"+Lf'+f3
dk = - m+b
n+n + fL' (l-tA)
The numerator is unambiguously positive. If the denominator is also positive,
an increase in capital intensity must be accompanied by a lower rate of
inflation. There are two different plausible conditions under which the
denominator will be positive. If the demand for money is interest inelastic
(L'=O), or, more generally, if the effect of interest on money demand is
small «n+n)fL'(l-tA) < m+b), the denominator will be positive. Alterntively,
regardless of the size of L', if inflation raises the effective tax rate on
capital income by enough to make the nominal after tax yield on capital vary
inversely with inflation (l-tA<O), both terms in the denominator will be
positive. In either case, increased capital intensity could not accompany a
higher saving rate unless the rate of inflation could be reduced.
It is easy to see why the safety trap condition implies that a greater
capital intensity entail$ a low~r rate of inflation. Consider the case of
inelastic money demand. The saf~ty trap implies that the demand for bonds
increases in proportion to the capital stock: db=f3dk. With inelastic money
demand, the money supply also increases with the capital stock: dM=Lf'dk.
But with no change in the government deficit, the steady state value of m+b
can increase only if the inflation rate is lower. In the alternate case in
which inflation increases the effective tax rate, the analysis is only
slightly more complex. If there were no change in inflation, the interest
rate would have to fall to maintain the minimum yield differential with greater- 25 -
capital intensity. But this would increase the demand for money, raising
m+b. This is incompatible with a constant inflation rate. If the inflation
rate increased, this would further reduce the yield on capital relative to
government bonds.
The problem of excess saving under these conditions can be avoided if
the government uses fiscal policy as well as monetary policy to accomodate
the additional saving. Consider first the possibility of responding to a
higher saving rate by reducing the rate of tax on capital income, T. With
a lower tax rate, the net of tax yield on the real capital stock can be main-
tained while the greater capital intensity depresses the pretax yield. To
confirm explicitly that this fiscal incentive is sufficient to permit greater
capital intensity, with no change in the rate of inflation, consider the four
equations that describe the "safety trap" equilibrium with dT:;O. The govern-
ment budget constraint with d~=O and d8=O implies d(m+b)=O. Substituting
this into the growth equilibrium (equation 3.1) shows dk/dcr>O exactly as in
equation 3.3. The two remaining conditions that must be satisfied are the
"safety trap" condition with d~=O:
(3.11) (l-T)f"dk - di - (f'+A~)dT = 0
and the condition that the change in the demands for debt and money leave m+b
unchanged:
(3.12) o = fL'di + (S+Lf')dk
Equation 3.12 shows that the interest rate must rise, reducing the demand for
money per unit of capital. With the unique increase in di determined by 3.12 and,- 26 -
the unique increase in k determined by 3.3, equation 3.11 shows the required
decrease in the tax rate T.
A higher saving rate can be transformed into greater capital intensity
with no change in inflation even without changing the tax rate on capital
income by an accomodating increase in the government deficit accompanied by a
lower rate of interest. The lower rate of interest balances the fall in the
return on real capital, permitting the real capital to be absorbed. The
greater deficit with the unchanged rate of inflation permits an increase in
both money and bonds that is required by the fall in i and increase in k.
To see all of this explicitly, note that with dT=dn=O, the safety trap
condition becomes
(3.13) (l-T)f"dk - di = 0
The increased demand for money and bonds is
(3.14) d(m+b) fL'di + (Lf'+B)dk
which, from 3.13, is
(3.15) d(m+b) (fL' (l-T)f" + Lf' + B)dk
Substituting this value of d(m+b) into the growth equilibrium (equation 3.1)
yields
(3.16) dk (l-y)f+n(m+b)
da = - (l-y)f'-n-(fL' (l-T)f"+Lf'+B)
This is unambiguously positive. The last term in the denominator, which
reflects the increased deficit (i.e., d(m+b)), reduces the size of dk/da but
does not alter the fact that it is positive. With dk determined by 3.16,
equation 3.15 implies a unique value of d(m+b»O. The government budget- 27 -
constraintwith dn=O then gives the required change in the deficit,
do = (n+n)d(m+b»O.
Although both the reduced tax on capital income and the increased deficit
are capable of turning additional saving into greater capital intensity
without a change in the price level (and therefore without the possibility
of a deflationary unemployment disequilibrium), the reduced tax on capital
income has at least three advantages over the increased government deficit.
First, and probably most important, the equilibrium capital intensity is
greater if the increased saving is accomodated by a lower tax rate. Second,
the lower tax rate on capital income reduces the excess burden caused by a
1 distorting tax. Finally, the tax reduction can be effective under special
conditions when the increased deficit would fail. More specifically, the
lower interest rate that must accompany the increased deficit would not be
possible if the economy is also in a liquidity trap, i.e., if investors are
2 unwilling to hold any asset other than money at a lower rate of interest.
Even in this case, the tax reduction (and increased rate of interest) can be
used to accomodate a higher rate of saving.
1The welfare gain from reducing the tax rate on capital income depends
on the way in which the lost tax revenue is recovered. Feldstein (1978) shows
that even when the uncompensated elasticity of saving with respect to its
return is zero, the excess burden of the tax system would be reduced by
lowering the tax on capital income and raising it on labor income. In the
current context there is the further complication that the increased deficit
and lower interest rate would permit lower total taxes.
2
In the notation of the model, L'=_oo at some low level of i. This
implies the extra constraint di~O which is consistent with equation 3.12 in
the context of a tax rate reduction but not with equation 3.13 when dT=O and
do>O. An increased deficit could avoid unemployment by the Keynesian remedy
of absorbing all of the additional saving, i.e., with dk=O.- 28 -
4. Some Conclusions
This paper has studied the long-run impact of fiscal policies on inflation
and capital formation. The analysis uses an expanded monetary growth model
in which the government finances its deficit by issueing both money and
interest-bearing debt.
One major focus of the paper is the effect of a permanent increase in
the government's real deficit in a fully employed economy. An important
conclusion is that such an increased deficit must raise the rate of infla-
tion or lower the capital intensity of production or both. The analysis
shows that the combination of both increased inflation and reduced capital
intensity is a likely outcome with current U.S. tax rules and the prevailing
monetary policy of allowing the interest rate to rise with inflation in a way
that keeps the real interest rate unchanged. Section 2 determines the debt
managementpolicy (and the corresponding change in the interest rate) that
would be required to maintain either a constant inflation rate or a constant
capital-labor ratio.
The second purpose of the paper is to analyze the effect of an exogenous
increase in the saving rate and the possibility of "excessive saving". The
problem of "excessive saving" arises when the yield on capital becomes so low
that individuals prefer to hold government bonds rather than the more risky
claims to real capital. Under some conditions, an increased rate of saving
could only be absorbed in increased capital intensity if the rate of inflation
could be permanently reduced. This requirement might entail a negative
inflation rate which, as a practical matter, would be precluded by the down-
ward rigidity of money wages. In this case, the additional saving would not
be absorbed but would result in unemployment.- 29 -
Section 3 shows first that there is no problem of excessive saving if
(1) investors are willing to hold real capital even though the differential
between its yield and that on government bonds is narrowed, and if (2) the
government reduces the interest rate on government bonds by expanding the
money supply more rapidly than the stock of bonds. When these conditions are
met, an increase in saving can be absorbed in greater capital intensity with-
out any change in either inflation or the government deficit.
A problem can arise if the economy is in a "safety trap," Le., if
investors would be unwilling to hold real capital if the difference between
its yield and that on government debt were reduced. In that case, an increased
saving rate can imply price deflation and therefore possible unemployment.
This problem can be avoided however by reducing the tax on capital income (or,
in some cases, by an increased deficit that absorbs some but not all of the
higher savings rate). In short, by using fiscal incentives as well as
monetary accomodation, an increased saving rate can be converted to greater
capital intensity.
The analysis as a whole, although clearly a theoretical study of a
simplified economy, suggests some insights that may help in understanding the
unsatisfactory macroeconomic experience of the past decade and in designing
more appropriate economic policies for the future. The recent years have
been characterized by substantial inflation, a low rate of investment, and
large government deficits. Section 2 shows how an increased government
deficit can give rise to both greater inflation and reduced capital intensity.
The combination of inflation and historic cost depreciation raised the effec-
tive tax rate on the income from real capital while the monetary and debt
management policies have kept the real interest rate on government debt
unchanged. The reduced equilibrium capital-labor ratio that this implies- 30 -
manifests itself as a lower rate of investment. The problem is then exacer-
bated when the government responds to increased investment by further
enlarging its deficit. The analysis suggests that a more appropriate solution
would be to reduce the deficit while stimulating investment through a lower
tax rate and a depreciation method based on current rather than historic
costs.
I have argued in a previous paper that the United States should increase
its saving rate to take advantage of the high social rate of return on addi-
tional investment.l Such an increase in the private saving rate could be
achieved by reducing the growth of social security benefits or by tax reforms
that make the personal income tax more like a consumption tax. These propo-
sals implicitly assumed that such extra saving would result in greater capital
intensity rather than in a fall in aggregate demand. Section 3 implies that
this assumption is warranted. With appropriate fiscal inventives and accomo-
dating monetary policies, an increase in saving can be absorbed in greater
capital intensity without any change in the rate of inflation.
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